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Introduction: Testing Freedom 
 
This book offers an updated overview of the diverse ways freedom is 
understood and practised across cultural contexts, including the 
emergent relationships between governance, autonomy and liberty that 
characterise everyday worlds. Oksala (2005: 209) has argued that when 
understood as a practice, ‘freedom is defined and gains a meaning only 
through the concrete operations through which its existence is tested. It 
emerges through the particular, political and/or personal struggles that 
try and test its limits, possibilities or extent’. In response, this volume 
mobilizes a wide range of ethnography in order to expand our 
understanding of the social dynamics, ontological assemblages, and 
referential acts by which the co-dependence of authority and freedom is 
re-created. In rethinking political protocol through the lens of ‘freedom’, 
we tackle a central concern: ‘How are normative claims used to present 
a particular way to define a problem and its solution, as if these were 
the only ones possible, while enforcing closure and silence on other 
ways of thinking and talking?’ (Shore and Wright 1997: 3)  
 
Our understanding of the daily operations of freedom in practice 
includes, then, a strong focus on the spaces of argument and 
negotiation wherein daily meanings of freedom appear and are tested, 
and how the material apparatus of freedom is operationalized opening 
new limits and horizons. Thus a wealth of ethnographic insight is 
provided in each of our chapters on how different people, in multiple 
sites across the world, deploy meanings of freedom that foreclose 
certain possibilities for comprehending and narrating freedom while 
opening others up. At ground level, the relationship of governance and 
freedom is mercurial – sometimes the intervention of authority allows 
further freedom, sometimes it is that which blocks the pathway to it. 
However, in our view, ‘governance through freedom’ is not an 
exclusive characteristic of late-liberal regimes (Rose 1999). 
 
Who or what can be free, or not free? To the extent that meaning is 
defined through reference, or acts of naming, different meanings of 
freedom deployed in daily life derive their significance from specific 
and contingent instructions that allow the particularities of freedom to 
be constituted. Hence, determining the meaning of freedom in daily life 
involves an analysis of practical power effects, as well as the struggles 
over which instructions, or policies, should be followed in order to 
determine who and what falls under the category of ‘the free’, and what 
or who should be excluded from it. Nevertheless, to address our 
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question satisfactorily an exploration of the relationship between 
semantics and ontology cannot be neglected. Each of the contributors to 
this volume adds an ethnographic focus to debates surrounding a 
family of terms that includes 'freedom', 'liberty', 'autonomy' and 'self-
determination'. In each case on view here we see elements of 
governance instantiated at the same moment that certain kinds of claim 
to freedom are defined and put into play. Some of the contributors give 
more focus to the semantics and pragmatics of freedom in language and 
daily life, others, choose to approach their ethnographic material as an 
ontological inquiry. 
 
To get us started, we propose some considerations regarding both the 
semantic problems implicated in anthropological studies of 'freedom', 
'liberty', 'autonomy' and 'self-determination', as well as, the ontological 
challenges that those who venture into the field may encounter along 
their path when they adopt an ethnographic approach (see, for example, 
Kelty in this volume). 
 
 
Autonomy versus freedom 
 
‘I doubt whether any anthropologist has set out to study a people’s 
ideas about freedom in the setting of a field situation’ Audrey Richards 
suggests at the beginning of a discussion of Central and East African 
concepts of freedom from the 1960s (1963:49). Richards was right that 
ethnographies with this focus were rare at the time she was writing. 
This had not always been the case, though, before the advent of 
professional anthropology. European travellers of earlier eras did 
attend to the striking ‘freedom’ of the peoples they visited. For example, 
Chrétien Leclerq and earlier Samuel de Champlain, both highlighted 
this when describing the Algonkian peoples they encountered in North 
America during the Seventeeth Century whose ‘self-reliant’ and 
‘outspoken demeanour’ impressed them considerably: 
 
Noone ever seemed to give orders nor to take them; while each 
acted on his own, all could coordinate their activities and work 
together. Further, their own sense of intrinsic freedom of 
movement in and the symbiosis with their woodland 
environment was brought into relief in discussions with 
Europeans, as the Indians gradually came to understand the 
nature of the environment from which they had come in Europe 
(McFeat 1974:53). 
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‘Freedom’ is still not a widely deployed concept in contemporary 
anthropology. In fact a certain implicit accusation of naivety attaches to 
any attempt to give ‘freedom’ analytical status, and part of our aim in 
this introduction is to debate why. However, if instead Richards had 
been asked to explore ‘autonomy’, she would have had to admit that 
the literature was already burgeoning, and has continued to grow. Why 
the difference? Is it because, rooted in ancient Greek, the word 
‘autonomy’ has a more academic ring than its Anglo-Saxon cousin 
‘freedom’? Or are there subtle specificities of emphasis and meaning at 
issue? As we will discuss later, one problem may be that the meaning of 
‘freedom’ is subtly entangled with Judeo-Christian controversies 
around ‘free will’ that anthropologists may hope to evade by using 
‘autonomy’ instead. Autonomy may fit better with the anthropologist’s 
overall emphasis on social or cultural conformity in a way that 
‘freedom’ does not (Laidlaw 2014, Murphy C. & J. Throop 2010).  
Either way, separately, or as a package, the core tenets of autonomy—
following one’s own path and rules in life, displaying mastery over 
one’s own condition, the desire to live independent of control by 
others—have been, with provisos to follow, ubiquitous in the modern 
ethnographic record. In contrast, ‘Freedom’ has appeared as a fuzzier, 
or sometimes overly narrow, target, seemingly harder to localise or 
define as Richards pointed out. As such, high valuations of autonomy 
are recorded in ethnographies from so many different locations—
Australasia, Africa, Asia, the American plains, Lowland Amazonia—
that we may reasonably infer some kind of primary intuition about 
what it means to be human either on the part of the people studied, or 
of ethnographers, or both.  
 
Anthropologists have witnessed this stress on autonomy especially in 
so-called small-scale, non-literate cultures, but also in large, state-like 
formations, where, even if people complain about its absence, the ideal 
is still ubiquitous. The principle of autonomy has been emphasized 
among some groups, such as the Indians of the North American Plains, 
almost to the point of cliché (e.g. Hoebel 1954:142-143). Clastres’ 
argument that lowland Amazonian societies have been fundamentally 
shaped by their pursuit of communal autonomy ‘against the state’ has 
been profoundly influential in ethnological work in that region too. In 
The Nuer, Evans-Pritchard gives us perhaps the classic description of 
how the struggle for autonomy has a role in creating order in an 
otherwise ‘anarchic’ society. In this quote ‘autonomous’ is synonymous 
with ‘free and independent’: 
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[A Nuer man] must always be prepared to fight, and his 
willingness and ability to do so are the only protection of his 
integrity as a free and independent person against the avarice 
and bullying of his kinsmen. They protect him against outsiders, 
but he must resist their demands on himself. The demands made 
on a man in the name of kinship are incessant and imperious and 
he resists them to the utmost. 
(1940:184) 
 
The Nuer has a strong focus on the contest for autonomy of young Nuer 
men, but classic studies by Phyllis Kaberry amongst others have 
witnessed a similar stress amongst Aboriginal women (1939), while 
Fred Myers has written in depth on the pursuit of autonomy both by 
Pintupi women and men in Western Australia (see Diane Austin-Broos, 
this volume on the idea of ‘living this way’) and Joanna Overing has 
written widely on the combined emphases on individual freedom and 
conviviality that characterize the interdependency of Piaroa women 
and men in Amazonia (e.g. Overing and Passes 2000). These are all 
cases of mobile, broadly egalitarian societies. Without going deeper into 
questions about how autonomy is differentiated within these societies—
e.g. between male and female, younger and older—what they show 
generally is that ideas akin to autonomy seem to be readily available 
everywhere ethnographers go. The fact that this is not simply a matter 
of empirical observation will hopefully become clear as this discussion 
opens outward. 
 
The liberty of translation 
As we may begin to recognise, identifying ‘freedom’ or ‘autonomy’ as 
existences in their own terms is not without complication. What 
possible definition of freedom could one suggest based on ethnographic 
research methods? Before proposing any answers, it helps if we make 
certain ‘pre-theoretical’ commitments more explicit: what is the 
presupposed relationship between freedom, the particular languages in 
which fieldwork is conducted, and the problem of translation? 
Notice how the following description of the Pintupi, extracted from its 
ethnographic context, might be understood to apply almost anywhere: 
‘Pintupi life is highly personalized; for people to abstract from the 
intimate and familiar is unusual. They place emphasis on individuals, 
their autonomy, and their capacity to choose courses of action’ (Myers 
1992:18). To take a quite different example, the Confucian concept of 
ziyou—if we are able momentarily to ignore radical differences of social 
Freedom in Practice: Governance, Autonomy and Liberty in the Everyday 
Moises Lino e Silva and Huon Wardle [PREPUBLICATION VERSION] (2016) 
 5 
scale and hierarchy—has a more than passing resemblance to those 
Pintupi principles. Ziyou is often glossed as ‘freedom’, but fits well, 
arguably better, with ‘autonomy’ since, literally, ziyou translates from 
Chinese as ‘self-follow’, a principle, in other words, of following one’s 
own route (Li 2014). As with the Pintupi, however, the kind of 
autonomy involved is understood to unfold out of a traditional range of 
values. And herein lies a problem—‘autonomy’ may seem to cover 
similar territory to ‘freedom’, and ‘autonomy’ may appear to be 
replayed across different social settings, but perhaps this is an illusion 
created by our attempts at translation.  
 
Take a different example, the Hindi term swaraj, which is likewise often 
glossed as ‘freedom’, was coopted during the struggle for Indian 
independence to mean both ‘self-rule’ and ‘home rule’ (with resulting 
ambiguities). For Gandhi, swaraj meant independence from colonial 
power, but had the deeper implication of cultivating capacities for 
personal self-governance as opposed to relinquishing control of oneself 
to the state (there are echoes of Kant here). In Gandhi’s view (as with 
Malinowski later in Freedom and Civilization), the only means to counter-
balance the ‘soulless’ power of the state was to enrich practices of 
voluntary association; the foundational analogy being life as a fellow 
villager. Gandhi thus argued against those who thought that swaraj 
would be achieved simply by transferring power to an independent 
Indian government (1910). All this suggests that the meaning of swaraj 
was already open for discussion well before independence. Either way, 
the matter turns out to be more complicated since the prefix sva in 
swaraj, though it suggests a personal pronoun, does not translate 
directly as ‘self’—instead it is closer to ‘own’, hence its bifurcating use 
to mean both ‘self’ and ‘home’. Vaidyanathan has therefore argued that, 
rather than ‘self-rule’, a truer translation of swaraj into English may be 
‘proper rule’ which paradoxically has the potential to mean the 
opposite of autonomy (Vaidyanathan 1989). Note that autos in ancient 
Greek means ‘self’ but also ‘same’: Orlando Patterson has argued that 
the Greek understanding of ‘self’ and hence the idea of self-governance 
evolved dialectically from the distinction between slaves who were 
ruled, and citizens who ruled themselves (1991).   
 
During Lino e Silva’s fieldwork in one of the largest Brazilian slums 
(see chapter 7) his interlocutors almost never used the word ‘freedom’ 
in their daily lives. Since the ethnography was conducted in 
Portuguese, people spoke of ‘liberdade’, ‘liberada’, ‘libertação’ and not of 
‘freedom’. This may sound obvious, but many difficulties arise from it. 
Peter Gow (see chapter 6) notes the various candidates for translating 
what we might take to be an antonym of ‘freedom’—‘slavery’—
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amongst the Piro. Each of these meanings has valences, including 
notions of kinship affiliation, absent from the liberal understanding of 
slavery, he argues. Hideko Matsui picks up this problem from a 
different angle when she discusses the political and cultural 
repercussions of transliterating the Dutch word ‘vrijheid’ (‘furaiheido’) in 
Japanese ‘without explaining the meaning of the original word’ (see 
chapter 2). Even in English, as we have pointed out in this introduction, 
and as Nigel Rapport explores further (chapter 1), there are subtle 
incommensurabilities between, and thus distinctive semantic potentials 
for deploying, words like ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’. Whereas, in other 
languages, such as Portuguese, the challenge is the opposite: ‘liberdade’ 
could mean both ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’. 
Any exercise of translation is unavoidably bound to indeterminacy. In 
fact, the theory of the indeterminacy of translation could help to further 
our ontological understanding of freedom. If we accept the position 
defended by Williard von Quine (1981), who argues that no translation 
is ever absolutely determined, the awareness that ‘freedom’ is not, for 
example, isomorphic with ‘liberdade’, or ‘living this way’ or even 
‘furaiheido’ seems to become both clearer and also less problematic. 
Quine (ibid: 23) explains that indeterminacy of translation reflects the 
fact that ‘two conflicting manuals of translation can both do justice to all 
dispositions of behavior, and that, in such case, there is no fact of the 
matter of which manual is right.’ To that extent, ‘freedom’ is 
understood as an imprecise translation of ‘liberdade’. The expectation, 
however, is that the replication of ethnographic instances in which the 
word ‘liberdade’ is put into practice in ‘the field’ may help to reduce 
some of the unavoidable indetermination of translation, so that an 
equivalence between the two terms can be more precisely delineated by 
each one of us, even if never completely resolved. Quine (ibid: 20) 
reminds us: ‘The translation adopted arrests the free-floating reference 
of the alien terms only relatively to the free-floating reference of our 
own terms, by linking the two’. 
The issue of translation preoccupies Caroline Humphrey in her writing 
on freedom. In 2007, Humphrey published an essay entitled 
‘Alternative Freedoms’, which is a more current example of an 
anthropology of freedom. The fact that the American Philosophical 
Society awarded a prestigious prize to Humphrey for that essay is an 
indication of how important an anthropological approach to the theme 
of freedom could be for other disciplines. Interestingly, though, in her 
text Humphrey intentionally brackets off discussions regarding what 
philosophers have to say about freedom. Instead, she emphasizes how 
some people in Russia, with whom she had been working for years, 
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referred to ideas similar to freedom. In Humphrey’s (2007: 1) words: ‘I 
want to use our word ‘freedom’ – whose multiple meanings will be 
implicit and left to your imaginations – to elicit, as it were, a range of 
ideas held in Russia.’ However, the author does not really address in 
depth the problem of how meanings left to imagination could still elicit 
certain ideas that the Russians held on freedom. 
In ethnographic studies regarding the topic of freedom in the lives of 
‘others’, if the researcher proposes to grasp the existence of freedom as 
an object of ethnographic research, the conditions of possibility for such 
an object to exist need to be somehow established. In most cases, 
researchers are happy to assume that a given meaning of freedom 
(often not spelled out) is a good enough theoretical basis to be deployed 
in their search for ‘freedom’ (or ‘autonomy’) in the research setting. For 
example, say an anthropologist has the following in mind: ‘freedom 
means X’. Having at some point experienced this specific ‘X’ meaning of 
freedom, during research, the ethnographer proceeds onward to look 
for objects similar enough to what the meaning ‘X’ accepts as ‘freedom’. 
Importantly, this is done independently of whether the others involved 
would necessarily call ‘X’ freedom, or not. Therefore, having 
encountered certain ‘freedoms’ in the field whose existence was initially 
allowed by ‘X’, the anthropologist proceeds to finding out what 
linguistic sign would best refer to ‘X’ in the specific language.  
The advantage of this strategy is clear. It addresses the issue of 
‘translation’ in a straightforward manner: translation becomes a matter 
of finding an object whose existence is allowed by the imaginative 
range offered by ‘X’ and of finding which specific linguistic signifier is 
used to refer to that object. This approach remediates a situation in 
which some people could be argued to have no freedom if they do not 
have the word ‘freedom’ (or an assumed direct translation of it) in their 
language. The disadvantage, however, is that it assumes a priori certain 
meanings for freedom that are not just difficult to spell out, but if they 
were possible to spell out, they would reveal that those ‘X’ meanings 
attributed to freedom are often the ones that the anthropologist already 
knows, and not necessarily meanings created by the people with whom 
the ethnography has been conducted. In an extreme scenario we could 
end up with ‘native’ objects and signs for a freedom that could have 
more meaning as ‘freedom’ to people foreign to that context than to 
people in it. It seems at least possible that the reiteration of ‘autonomy’ 
in many settings may indicate a pre-theoretical assumption on the part 
of the anthropologist; but what, in turn, does that imply? Some of the 
assumptions involved seem to be directly connected to how the self or 
subjectivity is thought to be constituted and how freedom is expected to 
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feature in this constitution. 
 
The subject of freedom 
 
As the last examples show, there are clear dangers in assuming too 
much about what people mean by the seemingly shared ideas—
freedom, autonomy, liberty. Returning specifically to autonomy, firstly, 
the significance of ‘self’—the ‘auto-’ in ‘autonomy’—can be radically 
indeterminate across cultures when measured against a certain kind of 
Euro-American expectation. After all, ethnographic surveys and models 
of what a ‘self’ is offer something of a smorgasbord. To take one 
instructive case, Marriott has argued that the image of an island-like 
individual self in a sea of social activity often encountered in Western 
thought is largely alien to the mainstream of Indian culture where 
instead the view of what it means to be human is fundamentally socio-
centric. Self is not here a causal force in its own right—it is not the self-
propelling soul or autokineton of Platonic philosophy—rather its 
consistency derives from the relations in which it is engaged. When the 
self becomes isolated from sustaining social relationships (by disease 
for example) it manifests this not in the form of a stripped down or bare 
individuality, but rather as a problematic ‘dividuality’ awaiting 
personal reintegration within the social matrix—the soul-body can only 
be made whole again through reconnection to others (1976). It turns out 
that this kind of relational view of the self is as widespread in the 
ethnographic literature as is the emphasis on autonomy—but perhaps it 
is equally as prone to problems of translation. Either way, social-holistic 
views of personhood and autonomy of this kind are often expressed in 
terms of bemusement with a Western philosophy of self that seems to 
imply: 
 
a little man stuck in a person’s head making all the decisions for 
that person. This little man cannot be shut off from outside. But, 
then, you wonder whether there is an even smaller man in the 
head of the little man, and so on and so forth (Li 2014). 
 
Since the self, in this kind of view, is the force behind and terminus of 
its own autonomous planned actions, this can seem to set off a 
regressive search for the absolute source of this (seemingly paradoxical) 
self-causing self-identity—an infinitely reiterated homunculus pushing 
the cognitive levers of so-called ‘free will’. The special philosophy of 
‘free will’ has given a unique twist to much European and North 
American thought especially since the European Enlightenment—
foregrounding a problem or conflict that seems either absent in other 
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worldviews, or as presenting an illusion to be overcome, as in 
Buddhism where arrival at an experience of ‘not-self’ offers a spiritual 
alternative to a life of subjective striving and desire (Gowans 2003:25). 
Indeed, Buddhist practices of liberating the self from its indebtedness to 
past and future, ego and other, suggest something of a polarity with a 
Western eschatology that understands these relations as precisely 
constitutive of ethical ‘free will’, as we will see in this introduction.  
 
As mentioned, the difficulty of disentangling ‘freedom’ from the 
philosophy of ‘free will’ probably gives one reason why anthropologists 
have preferred to talk about the ‘autonomy’ of the people they work 
with rather than their ‘freedom’. Certainly, we cannot discuss freedom 
without exploring the concept of free will, but we will leave that issue 
for now picking it up later. Suffice it to say that, if we are to take 
autonomy to be something like a universally available idea, then we 
will have to cut loose from the assumption that autonomy and free will 
are in effect the same. Some idea of a self that goes its own way remains 
behind though. The evidence suggests that autonomy offers a broad if 
not consistent foundation for the much more historically and culturally 
specific concept of free will; but not the other way round. Nineteenth 
Century teleologists such as Hegel argued that ‘free will’ was a 
necessary intellectual outcome of the dialectical struggle for autonomy 
at the apex of which is the self-governance of the fully individuated 
human being within a state. The contemporary position has to be much 
less secure to say the least. 
 
If the dimension of ‘self’—the ‘auto’ in autonomy—is significantly 
indeterminate, so too inevitably is the notion of ‘governance’— nomos, 
lawfulness—that is the second aspect of the word. The problem of 
‘lawfulness’ or governance cannot appear in the same way for someone 
who considers their life to be self-caused as it does for one who 
understands their personal actions as an outgrowth, or fluxional 
expression, of custom or of social relations. Historically, the idea of self-
government seems often to emerge as a reaction to restrictions on 
following a traditional pathway which in turn gives rise to an assertion 
of positive autonomy or self-determination. Some of the social forces 
involved are captured in this description by Lowie of Plains Indian 
individualism: 
 
The worst Crow insult was to tell a man that he had no relatives, 
for it meant that he was a social nobody subject to abuse. To a 
spirited lad this taunt, however, was a challenge: he could court 
spiritual blessings, distinguish himself in fighting, gain wealth, 
and ultimately shame his detractors (Lowie [1920]1954:124). 
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It is not ‘free will’ that is being claimed here, though this might be 
implied, what is at issue is the reintegration of someone back into the 
mainstream of community life, which has been cut off in one direction, 
by way of other kinds of valued relationship. We can note, in this 
regard, that in Europe conflicts over religious autonomy were rife long 
before the liberal enlightenment analytic of existential freedom gained 
traction. For example, the ‘antinomianism’ of 16th Century Protestants 
built on centuries of ideological struggle for religious self-governance 
vis-à-vis an incomprehensible, exclusive and socially distant church 
hierarchy.  
 
We should expect to find then, despite the broad generality of the idea 
of autonomy, that the pragmatic contexts and meanings accompanying 
it will vary dramatically. To take one example, for the Papuan 
Kapauku, according to Pospisil, individual freedom is an all-important 
cultural idea and this extends into how the relationship between soul 
and body is constituted—for Kapauku soul and body are autonomous 
agents whose cooperative efforts bring about individuality in the full 
sense—neither can achieve this on its own. Soul can dream in an inert 
body, bodily action can continue even in the absence of awareness, but 
neither soul nor body is a fully conscious person except in coalition. If, 
though, soul and body fail to acknowledge each other’s autonomy this 
will lead to sickness. Likewise if the individual is forced to work for 
others, or their movements are curtailed by being jailed, these restraints 
can cause fatal illness due to the body’s resistance to compulsion and 
the effect of this bodily revolt on the soul (1978:84-88). The Kapauku 
have stood out in the ethnographic record as a small-scale society 
characterized by values (individualism, personal freedom, commercial 
competitiveness) more usually vaunted amongst business-people in 
grand-scale commercial settings. Despite this seeming cultural 
familiarity though, as Pospisil shows, the integration of autonomy into 
their other cosmological ideas is distinctive. 
 
It is worth considering in this light that the relative ‘autonomy’ that a 
given person or community is able to claim offers a vital sign of how 
they are understood and valued by others around them. For example, 
this is what Pipyrou’s (chapter 4) demonstrates through her research on 
conflicts generated by the imposition of multi-governance through civil 
society organizations in South Italy. The boundaries of this process of 
authorizing autonomy are, of course, constantly open to extension and 
contraction. In a landmark decision, in May 2015, a New York judge 
issued a writ of habeas corpus on two chimpanzees held at laboratories in 
a local university, Stony Brook. Initially at least, the judgement seemed 
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to indicate willingness on the part of the judge to acknowledge 
arguments made by a group advocating ‘Non-Human Rights’ that the 
primates were ‘autonomous and self-determining being[s]’.1 The debate 
involved is telling at many levels, not least because it seems to take for 
granted that everyone concerned knows what ‘autonomy’ means in 
practice and the only remaining question is how to extend this idea to 
‘non-humans’. As we have already observed, this is hardly the case 
since, while autonomy taken loosely has seemingly universal valence, 
its pragmatic and situational ramifications can be radically distinctive: 
so much so that what is viewed as a move toward autonomy in one 
situation can be quite literally sickening and soul-destroying in another. 
In Hind Swaraj, Gandhi argues that the large number of British women 
engaged in paid work, and likewise the contemporary suffragette 
movement, was indicative, not of the growing autonomy of women, but 
instead of a deep moral sickness and malaise in a British way of life that 
was, he suggests, bound to destroy itself (1909:24). It may be a 
necessary feature of any particular discourse of freedom that it 
forecloses as much as it opens. 
 
Hence, we might say that, at least in most cultures that we are aware of, 
people seem to agree that autonomy is a valuable human (and non-
human) good for those deemed to deserve it, but, both cross-culturally 
and it would seem intra-culturally too, there may be little agreement 
about what this good looks like in context, even less in practice. 
 
Possible freedoms 
 
What I am afraid of about humanism is that it presents a certain 
form of our ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom. I 
think there are more secrets, more possible freedoms, and more 
inventions in our future than we can imagine in humanism as it is 
dogmatically represented on every side of the political rainbow: 
the Left, the Centre, the Right (Foucault 1988:15). 
 
These comments by Foucault contain a degree of cryptic optimism as 
well as elements of a theory about the conditions for freedom, both of 
which ask to be delved into. Foucault takes it as self-evident that 
‘humanism’ and ideas about ‘freedom’ are interconnected historically, 
but he proposes that freedom can also exist independently of 
humanism as we have known it up to now. There are more freedoms 
available to us than we currently imagine; either way, humanistic ethics 
in its current dogmatic version has perhaps outlived itself – other 
                                                
1 ‘I’ve Won a Day in Court for Two Chimps’ New Scientist May 11, 2015. 
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frameworks for freedom can be invented. Sundering humanism from 
freedom, as he elaborates elsewhere, calls for a rethinking of the self 
and the techniques that go into creating it. 
 
Freedom, if it is often used interchangeably with either autonomy or 
liberty, has resonances of its own. We have seen that freedom is often 
thought of technically as the ability to exercise ‘free will’. As we also 
saw, this idea causes considerable confusion to those for whom it 
suggests an infinite regress: does the self have within it another agent—
a ‘free will’ that triggers its ‘free’ actions? If so, what is this ‘free will’ 
triggered by? And so on. At quite another level ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’ 
and ‘liberty’ have different derivations and the differences in usage are 
suggestive. In English, autonomy indicates a capacity for self-rule, 
while the state of being ‘free’—‘freedom’—suggests something else; not 
only action that goes unimpeded, but feelings and behaviour that are 
spirited, generous and whole-hearted. Cognate words including ‘frank’ 
and ‘friendly’ supply further insights, as do the old Norse word frja, to 
love, Old Saxon friohan, to court or woo, not to mention contemporary 
Dutch, vrijen, to woo or caress. There seem to be charismatic and 
enthusiastic qualities to being ‘free’ that are not so obvious when we 
refer to possessing ‘autonomy’, or ‘liberty’.  
 
Liberty, which derives from Latin liber, a free person, is rooted 
etymologically in the idea of growing amongst a people (Indo-
European, leudh- to grow up; people; free, Shipley 1984:220). From this 
viewpoint liberties derive from growing with, and hence having rights 
in, a community. In this vein, Humphrey notes that svoboda, one of the 
Russian words translated as ‘freedom’ indexes a ‘Svoi’ or ‘We’ who are 
‘full members of the patriarchal and kin-based community’ suggesting 
something more like the root meaning of ‘liberty’ than ‘freedom’ 
(2007:2). Like freedom and free, liberty has an adjectival form, liberal, 
but liberal and free have only limited semantic overlap in English. In 
the case of Liberty and autonomy the idea of regulation by norm or law 
is a necessary element of the definition, but this is not so with freedom. 
When, in The Social Contract, Rousseau defines true liberty as ‘obedience 
to a law which we prescribe to ourselves’ he might equally be defining 
autonomy: indeed, Kant turns Rousseau’s view into his own logic of the 
‘autonomous will’. ‘Autonomous’ and ‘free’ correspond more closely in 
meaning than ‘free’ and ‘liberal’, but, as we have already seen, what 
they bring to mind is also subtly different too. ‘Free’, draws most 
directly on the image of a self that is able to do whatever it wants to the 
fullest extent, whole-heartedly. The notion of a kind of governance to 
which freedom corresponds is only a secondary consideration. It is 
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precisely in relation to this indeterminacy of freedom that the 
philosophical problem of ‘free will’ arises. 
 
As opposed to liberty or autonomy, then, in English usage at least, 
freedom is an unruly and, quite literally, underdetermined concept. 
Liberties, we can say, derive their meaning from participation in the life 
and growth of a community; they are ‘taken’ or enacted publicly with 
and against others whose status is thereby marked. We can note how in 
the 17th Century ‘liberal’ was a term of abuse for persons who acted or 
spoke ‘unrestrained by prudence or decorum’2—a meaning that has 
reappeared in contemporary American political discourse. Autonomy is 
as much a mode of self-discipline as it is a rejection of external rule; no 
doubt a potentially satisfying one when thought of in connection with 
ideas of personal maturation and the ability to think and act for oneself. 
There is clear commonsense meaning to freedom that seems to be rather 
too quickly ruled out of court by philosophers and other ethical 
theorists as naïve, namely ‘doing and saying what I like’. Again, by this 
definition, the minimal description of freedom as ‘acting without 
constraint’ seems insufficient on closer inspection: freedom always 
implies a charismatic sense of subjective abundance, even love. 
Freedom is surely more than simply a lack, or an absence of, control. 
Either way, playing up these distinctions between liberty, autonomy 
and freedom should remind us, if nothing else, that these words can 
carry with them unconsidered implications even into the most carefully 
thought-through theoretical discourse. Distinctions like these, between 
some of the English valences of ‘freedom’ versus those of ‘liberty’ are 
taken up by Nigel Rapport in his discussion of the artist Stanley 
Spencer (chapter 1). A liberal society will make institutional space for 
individual freedom, even of the sometimes extreme imaginative types 
that Spencer instantiates, but ‘freedom’ in this analytical use is divided 
from ‘liberty’ in much the same way that the world as it exists for the 
imagining subject is divided from how it exists objectively, Rapport 
argues. 
 
 
The politics of ‘free will’ 
 
Hannah Arendt holds that we have St Augustine to blame for the 
special status of ‘free will’ in Western philosophy (1978). In his 
Confessions, Augustine sets up ‘willing’ as the dimension of self that 
unifies and organises ‘being’ and ‘knowing’ when the time comes to act 
in the world. Only because I will does the awareness of what I am and 
                                                
2 Cf. Oxford English Dictionary: ‘Liberal’, adjective & noun, definition 3a. 
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what I know take the shape of a unified self that acts definitively. 
Unlike God, a human self cannot know itself absolutely or 
transcendentally: forced to know the world in time, hence blinded from 
absolute truth, the self must depend on its free will to make its own 
path, for good or ill. Augustine arrives at this integral force of the will 
by distinguishing it from the ‘heresy’ of the manichees for whom the 
self was a chaotic battleground of spiritual forces. Precisely by 
emphasizing the conflict of the will with itself Augustine is able to 
make a unifying free will the crucial factor that demonstrates the 
integrity of the self. It is the self-evident conflict of willing - a soul that 
wills and nills at the same moment - that characterizes knowledge of 
the self as someone who judges how to act in time (Arendt 1978:84-110).  
 
If Arendt is right, then Augustine has bequeathed, at least to 
Westerners, a truly multi-layered, three-dimensional epistemological 
conundrum. It may be much less easy than we think to extract the 
ingredients we don’t like—to escape some of those humanist ideas 
about freedom that that Foucault refers to. Either way, Augustine’s 
argument is further embedded in a much deeper and more widely 
ramifying set of cosmological assumptions about the place of human 
beings in the world—at the centre of which is a particular myth of 
origin. Here is how Fromm describes and analyses it: 
 
The biblical myth of man’s expulsion from Paradise… identifies 
the beginning of human history with an act of choice, but it puts 
all emphasis on the sinfulness of this first act of freedom... Man… 
acts against God’s command, he breaks through the state of 
harmony with nature of which he is part... From the standpoint of 
the church… this is sin. From the standpoint of man, however, 
this is the beginning of human freedom… freeing himself from 
coercion… committing a sin is… the first human act (Fromm 
1965:49-50). 
 
For humans living in history (that is, acting in time), understanding the 
world begins with a singular choice, a free act, a fully human act, also 
the first sinful act because it defies the order of the cosmos. Freedom 
may suggest love, abundance and an enthusiastic state of 
indeterminacy, but, cosmologically speaking, free action is sin, defiance 
and ignorance. As Fromm argues, in Abrahamic doctrine, the 
relationship of divine order and human freedom is irretrievably 
paradoxical. Compare the above statement with one derived from 
anthropologist Paul Radin’s fieldwork with a group of hunter-
agriculturalists, the Winnebago: 
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The right… to freedom of expression [amongst the Winnebago] is 
never for a moment questioned…. Free expression of thought 
was the order of the day and was viewed as a purely private 
concern, system-mongering or a systematic theology, for instance, 
was quite useless… It remained the expression of a particular 
man or, at best, of a particular group ([1927]1957:57) 
 
As Radin argues, for the Winnebago at least, personally held thoughts 
and theories posed no particular problem to community life. There 
were in this setting no book-based codes of ethics against which freely 
formulated ideas could or should be judged. Either way, personally 
held interpretations had little effect on the fundamental needs and 
flows of social life. Freedom was taken for granted, but ‘Free will’ did 
not here arise as a distinct question because thinking and acting did not 
happen in the shadow of the Word of God. This, he noted, was in stark 
contrast to those literate cultural settings where the written word often 
takes on the aspect of an absolute objectivity against which subjectively 
held thoughts and actions must be measured and judged—with a 
resultant ‘distortion in our whole psychic life’ (Radin 1957:61). In 
Augustine’s and others’ accounts of the experience of monotheism, the 
question, theologically at least, becomes one of how to conform out of 
the finitude of one’s own life to the divine word given how little 
knowledge of God’s intention is subjectively available. It should be 
noted that while freedom of thought and a high emphasis on autonomy 
in people of the Plains like the Winnebago, individual actions were 
policed where they posed a threat to communal life—to the food supply 
in particular (cf. Lowie 1954:126).  
 
As Fortes shows in his analyses of the ancestor-worshipping Tallensi, 
the key psychological conundrums involved in the notion of free will 
are not in any absolute way confined to monotheistic cultures. Tallensi 
eldest sons worry constantly about whether their decisions and actions 
are in conformity with the will of their male ancestors (1959). However, 
as Gellner likewise indicates, it has been in monotheistic settings—
where the holy book and the sword combine in a single mode of 
domination—that the paradoxical qualities of ‘free will’ have taken on a 
particularly hard political outline (1988). And, as Chris Kelty points out, 
this writing of free-will into the source-code of cultural life continues 
quite literally into the Western present (see chapter 8). Echoing 
Gellner’s account, Edmund Leach argues that in small-scale societies 
like the Kapauku, the individual can sometimes be ‘moderately free 
because his rulers are incompetent rather than because they are 
benevolent’ (1963:81). This self-confessedly cynical view, which 
assumes that the rules of society are imposed not agreed, is nonetheless 
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of some relevance in thinking about Radin’s case study. If ‘freedom of 
expression’ amongst the Winnebago changes little about the social 
situation—that is, if it makes no authentic difference to how people lead 
their social lives—then is it really freedom at all? Malinowski (1947) 
reserves some of his harshest criticism for Boas who, along somewhat 
similar lines, proposes that freedom ‘is a concept that has meaning only 
in a subjective sense. A person who is in complete harmony with his 
culture feels free. He accepts voluntarily the demands made up on him’. 
By that standard, Malinowski responds, the person who has fully 
incorporated ‘Nazi indoctrination’ is free. 
 
Free will, as commentators like Foucault, and indeed many others, have 
pointed out, describes a special historical configuration of psychological 
and epistemological concerns. Even so, it is difficult, looking out at the 
world from within the field where those concerns operate, not to 
question the validity of other understandings of freedom. If someone 
seems to be absent of a kind of constraint that I feel in my life (as when 
Radin describes the Winnebago as feeling no restriction on expressing 
their diverse personal worldviews), does that mean that they are 
positively free (see Berlin 1958), or am I simply projecting a concern of 
my own onto their way of life? Malinowski confronts (or perhaps 
avoids) the same problem when he argues that purely subjective 
understandings of freedom, ones based on how or whether people 
imagine themselves to free or not, can never answer the question of the 
social value of freedom. Freedom for Malinowski is an objective 
element of, and an increment in, customary social action; what people 
may or may not think about freedom is of little consequence compared 
to what they actually do, how, in other words, freedom is built into 
their patterns of social action.  
 
Here we might respond, based on our previous discussion, that 
Malinowski is really talking less about ‘freedom’ than about ‘liberty’. 
Indeed, Malinowski’s view of freedom as a social ‘surplus’ available to 
people who share a common language, customs, laws and techniques 
fits exactly with the etymology of ‘liberty’, but rather less well with the 
unruly and charismatic concept, freedom. The degree to which mid-
Twentieth Century social anthropologists thought that the subjective, 
imaginative or existential aspects of freedom were irrelevant or 
detrimental to their concerns is striking. Leach (1963) violently 
disagrees with Malinowski’s functionalist view of freedom, but he is 
equally indifferent to how people might feel or think about their own 
freedoms; he is only interested in the socially objective side of the 
matter—freedom is relevant only as an objective political datum or 
symbol in a given social system. As suggested already, in this volume 
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we tend to use ‘liberty’ to describe the public and objective aspect of 
freedom, but we also allow ourselves room to consider freedom in other 
ways; ways that Leach and Malinowski would like to rule out. 
 
The problem of ‘free will’ continues to be a problem precisely because it 
falls between the subjective and the publicly verifiable dimensions of 
what it means to be a human being. Given the objectivity of divine law 
and individual’s limited comprehension of the world, ‘free will’ comes 
into play as the ethical mode in which action may be understood either 
to conform to God’s plan or diverge sinfully from it. ‘Free will’ is not 
the same as ‘freedom’; it is a special theory of how human individuality 
plays out in a world where the rules must be somehow distinguished 
‘through a glass darkly’. The problem here is that since anthropologists 
in the phase of disciplinary consolidation tended to ignore subjective 
experience in favour of accounts centred on cultural or social pattern, 
the problems involved (falling as they do between the disciplinary 
stools of psychology and anthropology) have remained unexplored 
(Laidlaw 2014). 
 
 
Freedom between imagination and bodily action 
 
For years, I have dreamed of a liberated anthropology. By 
‘liberated’ I mean free from… a systematic dehumanizing of the 
human subjects of study, regarding them as the bearers of an 
impersonal ‘culture’, or wax to be imprinted with ‘cultural 
patterns’, or as determined by social, cultural or social 
psychological ‘forces’, ‘variables’, or ‘pressures’ of various kinds. 
Victor Turner (1979:60) 
 
Certainly, some anthropologists have reacted strongly against the idea 
that only the objective cultural pattern counts when understanding 
social life; as Victor Turner does in this quote, invoking the concept of a 
‘liberated anthropology’. Turner argues here for re-envisaging social life 
as an unfolding improvisatory drama rather than as a closed system, a 
drama in which subjective free-play is crucial. But, though the counter-
modernist ideas that Turner talks about have been much discussed in 
anthropology, it is not obvious that they have led to a considerably 
greater critical understanding of the interrelationship between ‘cultural 
patterns’ and freedom as a cohere in self experience.  
 
Are there ways of understanding these two aspects as part of the same 
picture? Or, are we condemned always to divide the subjective from the 
objective, social forces from subjectivity, perhaps inevitably reducing 
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one to the other? When we talk about our ‘sense of freedom’, i.e. when 
we dive into the existential experiencing of freedom in the way that 
Malinowski wanted to rule out, we find that this sense is closely 
bundled with other features of consciousness more broadly. In 
particular our feelings of freedom seem to be bound up with the special 
relation between reflectively imagining the world and existing bodily 
and materially in it. Lev Vygotsky gives an illustration of this in his 
discussion of the play-learning of children: 
 
The difference between the practical intelligence of children and 
animals is that children are capable of reconstructing their 
perception and thus freeing themselves from the given structure of the 
field (1978:35, our italics) 
 
It is precisely what happens during and immediately after this moment 
of imaginative abstraction that indicates the stage of learning that the 
child has reached. Vygotsky refers to this as the zone of ‘proximal 
development’ 1978:86. He is working with a classic definition of play as 
an imaginative activity, where imagination is defined as the capacity to 
re-present something in the mind which is at that moment absent to the 
senses. Given what we now know about play amongst animals we may 
question the special status Vygotsky awards human infants in this area. 
However, for the purposes of this discussion, Vygotsky is making an 
important link between the feeling and meaning of freedom and the 
capacity to imagine. Play involves children in the important 
imaginative work of ‘freeing themselves’ from reality in order to 
remake it in their own minds. In this way learning entails a crucial kind 
of freedom. For children, play, manipulation of the object world is also 
freedom from material constraints—the resistance the world presents as 
a ‘given structure’. 
 
We will return to how ‘freedom’ is like ‘play’ later. For now, we can 
note that this insight into the role of freedom in subjective experiencing 
takes us in a very different direction to the view (or absence of view) 
provided by classic anthropology that Turner highlighted. The special 
analytical status that Vygotsky gives to freedom in combination with 
imagining is also present in a widely held understanding that the most 
easily available kind of freedom takes the form of escape into the 
imagination. This is the purely subjective freedom that Malinowski 
dismisses; but what if imagination has a crucial role in enabling the 
public ‘liberties’ that he thought were truly important? Once we look at 
certain kinds of ethnographic material through this lens we may find 
that the processual triad that Vygotsky highlights—given reality, 
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imaginative freedom, reconstruction of reality—gives us vital clues for 
understanding not only freedom, but also liberty and autonomy.  
 
In order to illustrate the interpretive difficulties involved, we can take 
here a classic though complicated case presented to us by Maurice 
Leenhardt. In his ethnological work, Do Kamo, Leenhardt argues that 
the Canaques he lived with during the 1900s did not understand human 
individuality in the way Europeans generally did (Leenhardt 
[1947]1979). In particular, somewhat akin to Marriott’s picture of an 
Indian type of ‘dividual’ and permeable self (see above), Canaques did 
not hold that selfhood implied the continuous and exclusive 
cohabitation of a mind with a body through time. To begin with, for 
them, there was no concept closely mapping what Westerners call a 
‘body’. Canaques nonetheless evidenced a notion of self that is familiar 
in some other respects. For example, Leenhardt informs us that when 
they told stories about themselves, rather than recalling spatio-
temporally distant events back to their mind-body in the present 
moment, Canaque story-tellers would send their soul or ego out to the 
places where that event is located with their listeners as company. As 
far as the narrator-traveller is concerned, this all requires spatial-
navigational capacities rather than skills of reconstructing dispersed 
temporal events. There is no problem of hysteresis or time-dependence 
for Canaques, then, though there is the danger of getting lost (1979:84-
85). Clearly Canaques understood the capacities of the self in an utterly 
different way to, say, Augustine for whom the human ego is thrown 
contingently into, and must reconstitute itself from, the passage of time 
(which is why the universality of ‘free will’ is so crucial as a reference 
point for him). However, this does not mean, in contrast, that Canaques 
had no ideas about freedom. 
 
For all the complexity of Canaque concepts of human capacity, they 
seem to have held quite familiar ideas about the relationship between 
the ego who imagines a place for itself in the world versus the ‘me’ that 
is constrained by its own bodily presence for others. This becomes 
clearer when Leenhardt describes Canaque ideas about suicide: 
 
For them suicide is a method of passing from the state of living to 
the state of bao—a state of invisibility and release from the body, 
where, liberated from the laws of this world, they can increase their 
strength tenfold and at the same time regain their dignity by 
satisfying their need for vengeance ([1947]1979:39 our italics). 
 
What Leenhardt is indexing with the word ‘body’ in this sentence is a 
little unclear, because he has been explicit otherwise that Canaques do 
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not have a unified understanding of the body. However, the general 
sense is plain; freedom most closely corresponds to removal of material-
bodily constraints in order to give vent to certain kinds of desires of the 
soul-ego; suicide is specifically a liberation and way of achieving 
revenge. This is surely freedom as the ability to ‘do what I want’, albeit 
played out in an unfamiliar cosmological frame. Leenhardt goes on to 
point out that highly dramatized suicides are widely documented in 
Melanesian ethnography, but they did not represent a death wish as a 
Western reader might have it, because, again, Canaques did not 
understand death to mean an irretrievable end of life, more a personal 
sea change. In this Canaque drama, the soul is pitted against the 
material constraints of its embodied presence in the world and the 
value this has for others. Suicide is an escape by the imagining ego from 
its current material presentation: it involves a loss of bodily presence, 
but importantly also a renunciation of accountability to others. There 
are important clues here, it would seem, to what might be a primary 
type of imagined freedom. 
 
The constraints which face the self may vary, but this seemingly 
primary freedom is the thought that the self can remove or evade those 
constraints, even at the risk of losing its own bodily connection to the 
situation. Arendt points to part of a dialogue between Socrates and 
Callicles in the Gorgias that has a significant resonance with this 
Canaque view. Discussing the proposition that it is ‘better to be 
wronged than to do wrong’. Callicles contends according to the 
contemporary public norms that ‘to suffer wrong is not the part of a 
man at all, but that of a slave’. In contrast, Socrates’ puts forward the 
view that:  
 
It would be better for me that my lyre or a chorus that I directed 
should be out of tune and loud with discord, and that multitudes 
of men should disagree with me rather than that I, being one, 
should be out of harmony with myself and contradict me (in 
Arendt1978:181).  
 
In other words, whether a person is correctly acting the part of ‘man’ or 
‘slave’ is of little importance compared to the contradictions that appear 
in one’s understanding of oneself; this difference cannot be resolved 
simply by doing what is publicly expected. Socrates points to the 
difference between the mores that operate in the conduct of public life 
versus how the mind orients itself in its own situation. Hence, whatever 
liberties or constraints present themselves in the public arena, there is 
still the freedom of the mind to think otherwise. When Socrates talks of 
‘being one’ he is, Arendt argues, contrasting this imaginative awareness 
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against the ‘chorus’ of multiplying relationships the self finds itself 
caught up in—including the ramifying relationships of slave and 
master that Callicles refers to. Only by escaping back into conscious 
reflection can the self reconstruct the given structure of its field of action 
as something meaningful for its own life. Socrates is, then, demanding a 
special kind of freedom or autonomy for thought itself. 
 
This kind of capacity for escape into reflective awareness—and 
concomitantly the freedom that consciousness feels vis-à-vis its 
existence for others in a publicly shared reality—seems to provide at 
least one fundamental analogy for freedom and autonomy in general. 
Georges Devereux, the psychoanalyst and anthropologist, indexes a 
strong corollary for this when he talks of ‘the trauma of the 
unresponsiveness of matter’. He gives the example of Hopi mourners 
slapping the dead and accusing them of having died on purpose to 
grieve their survivors (1967:33). The soul is here understood as having 
maliciously used its subjective freedom or autonomy to leave the world 
where it should be accountable to those around it. This calls to mind 
other examples when people deliberately absent themselves, as when a 
child plays ‘peekaboo’. The logic is not only close to that presented by 
the egoistic suicide of the Canaques, or Kapauku ideas about the 
mutual autonomy of soul and body, it reiterates the fundamental issue 
that consciousness is aware of a kind of freedom in its own thoughts, 
desires etc. that is in contrast to the relative unresponsiveness it 
encounters as a bodily presence in the material world. The words of a 
young American to Fred Alford point once more to this fissure: 
  
‘My cubicle at work is like a jail cell. My boss is a tyrant. But in a 
way it doesn’t matter. I can think what I want about him, about 
work, about anything. In my mind I’m free.’ 
Do you ever wish you were a little less free in your mind, and a 
little freer at work? I asked. 
‘I never thought of it that way,’ replied Sandra. ‘One doesn’t 
really have much to do with the other, does it?’ (Alford 2005:14) 
 
Recognising this kind of subjective freedom certainly does not 
contradict Malinowski’s view that liberties are more than mere thought-
stuff; for freedom to correspond to something actual we must have 
freedoms, or lack them, in our lives in the world, not merely in our 
ruminations or imaginings. However, perhaps Vygotsky provides us 
with the factor that links the two sides of this impasse. Sure enough, the 
ruminative freedom of the Canaque, or of cubicle worker Sandra, to 
escape out of their material circumstances into the unconstrained life of 
the soul or ego is a recognizable, if a one-sided, freedom; but what of 
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the freedom the child experiences as it plays, who steps out of the 
‘given structure of the field’ in order to reorder, and then re-enter, that 
field? In this case the freedom has both a reflective escapist side and an 
intentional active one—freedom here presents itself not only in the act 
of reimagining the perceptual field, but also as an effect in the world, a 
change to the world. And this is not just a useful description of the role 
of freedom in childhood play-learning but also of the effects of 
imagination-led action in general: there can exist a productive 
relationship between imagined freedoms and practicably attainable 
liberties. But it must be admitted that this relationship sound a lot like 
the dialectics of ‘free will’. 
 
 
 
Free-play: Freedom and Play 
 
Play is simultaneously liberty and invention, fantasy and 
discipline. 
(Roger Caillois 2001)  
 
If we are asked ‘what does freedom feel like?’ we may well find great 
difficult in giving any kind of definitive answer. If we were pressed we 
might reach for a suitable analogy—freedom is like ‘driving fast… no 
one else around’, ‘the sensation of flying or falling in love’, ‘being some 
other better person while remaining yourself’, ‘mastering a set of 
difficulties one by one’. The metaphors involved seem inadequate and 
excessively diverse; sceptics regarding freedom might wonder if, as 
Levi-Strauss claimed sarcastically for the Polynesian concepts mana or 
hau, whether ‘freedom’ might be ‘a mystification’—‘an effect quite often 
produced in the mind of ethnographers by indigenous people’ 
(1987:47). However, it is also noteworthy that the images we tend to 
conjure up for freedom have something in common with how we 
describe play behaviour. Just as Caillois separates play into 
‘vertiginous’, ‘aleatory’, ‘mimetic’ and ‘competitive’, so too feelings of 
freedom seem to be distinguishable along rather similar lines (Caillois 
2001). 
 
Discussing Vygotsky’s ideas we have already mentioned play as a 
situation where freedom seems instrinsic. The connection can be taken 
further. While play produces a kind of order insofar as it ‘marks itself 
off from the course of the natural process’, Huizinga argues, play is 
nonetheless ‘free, [it] is in fact freedom’ (1949:8). Freedom, like play, 
takes on its concreteness vis-à-vis the unresponsiveness of everyday life 
against which it creates its own field and the meaning of freedom 
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acquires specificity as a kind of play. Perhaps as Huizinga argues, then, 
what we mean by freedom and play is not simply analogous but 
identical—perhaps freedom is play? Even if this turns out to be a 
flawed view, it is worth probing further for the insights we may gain. 
 
Consider, for instance, how Meyer Fortes describes the play behaviour 
of children in Taleland, Northern Ghana. Their play reflects the cattle-
herding and agricultural lifestyle: it involves, for example, making a 
cattle kraal out of dust, with twigs for a pen and locusts for cattle; or 
setting up an ancestor shrine out of a pile of mud with a pot shard for 
the hoe that is a crucial element in the ‘real’ shrine. For Tallensi girls 
and boys play is education; children play at, reorganize and integrate 
diverse adult behaviours and meanings until finally they have 
themselves become competent adults in their own right and the 
activities involved have acquired serious consequences. There is great 
attentiveness to the rules of adult life but without the adult emphasis on 
a necessary and absolute order. In their play children rehearse the 
‘interests, skills and obligations’ presented to them by the world of 
adults, creating ‘experiments in social living without having to pay the 
penalty for mistakes’ (1976:475). What is key here is the capacity to 
experiment without penalty: if we look at the descriptions of freedom 
that Malinowski arrives at in Freedom and Civilization then that 
definition would fit well. Again, perhaps freedom is simply play by 
another name.  
 
The freedom of play is paradoxical because the freedom to play 
depends on principles governing a reality that truly exists outside the 
parameters of the playworld—the cattle kraals of Tallensi children’s 
imagination are free creations, but actually existing cattle kraals are the 
products of serious work whose parameters and consequences are well-
defined. Gregory Bateson illustrates the paradox at the heart of play 
with a case of two dogs at sport where one plays at biting, without 
actually biting, the other. ‘[T]he actions of ‘play’ are related to, or 
denote, other actions of ‘not play’, he proposes (1976:121), but how can 
reality divide itself ‘play’ and ‘not play’ forms which are nevertheless 
co-dependent?’ Bateson’s answer lies in cognitive awareness of the 
difference between ‘map’ and ‘territory’. Dogs at play, like human 
beings, have varying levels of reflective awareness concerning the 
difference between how their thoughts map the world versus how the 
world is in itself. Between biting and not biting a third option—playing 
at biting—offers an alternative; but one that can only exist in the gap 
between map an territory. Free-play thus appears as a space of its own 
in between how the world is experienced and how it can be imagined.  
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Similarly, according to Huizinga, in its concreteness, freedom is key in 
play and freedom itself manifests as play. This implies that the limits of 
freedom are the limits of the field or frame of play behaviour. And yet, 
as Huizinga argues—Fortes claims this too—there is no type of serious 
activity that has not been formulated initially in the form of play—we 
arrive at our notions of the serious, the obligatory and rule-governed at 
least initially by way of free-play, free association. This means that we 
experience freedom regarding binding social obligations before we 
adopt those obligations as a serious fact of life. For example, we 
experience the correct practice of gender roles or scholastic codes first as 
a kind of freely enacted play, then as existential facts. Those who have 
arrived in the world of adult seriousness may, on this account, dip out 
of the code of quotidian reality occasionally by way of various types of 
sociability, game, or fantasy each of which has its own arena, rules of 
play and feeling of freedom. From this angle we can see how the 
discourse of freedom can differ from the experience of freedom rather 
as playing differs from the rules or frame provided for the game. 
 
Pierre Clastres provides an example of this in his discussion of the 
solitary nighttime singing of men who hunt in Aché (Guayaki) society. 
In a setting which was particularly dependent on hunting for a 
livelihood, Aché placed a number of obligations on huntsmen including 
the fact that they must never consume their own catch, and that they 
must share a wife. For the group as a whole, the rules promulgated 
autonomy and constant reciprocity—all captured game being 
distributed within the group, no individual could stand out above 
others or against the community. However, Clastres notes that the 
hunters songs suggested a rebellion against this, an assertion of 
individual freedom: ‘I am a great hunter’ they would sing, ‘I am in the 
habit of killing with my arrows, I am a powerful nature incensed and 
aggressive… Cho, cho cho (me, me, me)’ (1977:94). For Clastres the 
parameters of nighttime song temporarily allowed a mode of absolute 
individualism to appear in a society where the imperative to exchange 
is otherwise omnipresent: 
 
Thus the song of the hunter… provides a refuge in which to 
experience the freedom of his solitude. That is why, once night 
has fallen, each man takes possession of the realm that is his own 
preserve, where, at peace with himself, at last he can dream 
through his words the impossible ‘talk with oneself’… The same 
man exists, then, as a pure relation in the sphere of exchange of 
goods and women, and as a monad, so to speak in the sphere of 
language. It is through song that he comes to consciousness of 
himself as an I and thereby gains the legitimate usage of that 
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personal pronoun. The man exists for himself in and through his 
personal song: I sing, therefore I am (1977:102-103). 
 
The delimited character of this special songworld that Aché men enter 
at a certain time of day, and the type of personal catharsis it 
foregrounds shows Clastres that ultimately the freedom involved is 
limited; finally these Aché men ‘cannot but respect the rules of the 
social game’, he argues (1977:103). Clastres does not give us any further 
indication of how Aché men imagined things, so we have little means to 
judge whether in singing they were indeed conforming with the ‘rules 
of the social game’, or the extent to which the songs may have 
constituted a claim, as Sandra put it, that ‘in my mind I am free’.  
 
Clastres’ description suggests, amongst other things, a characteristic 
urge in mid-twentieth century social anthropology (already described 
here) toward seeing society as a totality regarding which the human self 
is a part. At the same time he also notes the urge toward individual 
freedom as something perhaps natural, certainly inevitable given the 
particular social forces and conflicts at work. This, we should remind 
ourselves, is the view of the social that Victor wished to escape from 
when he argued against anthropology’s tendency to regard human 
subjects of study as bearers of an impersonal ‘culture’… determined by 
social, cultural or social psychological ‘forces’, ‘variables’, or ‘pressures’ 
of various kinds’. For Turner freedom is crucial since social life is not 
actually systematic (however much people may believe this is the case) 
but is rather the expression of constant improvisation by particular 
actors always trying  out which symbols they will make use of, how 
they will weight certain gestures, where they will place themselves on 
the stage of action, make use of certain kinds of material props, and so 
on.  
 
A problem which may arise in our intuitive reaction to Turner’s core 
metaphor—life is drama—is that, while it gives back the free-play of 
improvisation to people rather than viewing them as cut out parts of a 
social totality, the extension of the metaphor of drama melts the 
distinction between real world and play world—the living individual is 
now an actor playing a part in a theatrical representation, but a 
representation of what? In the dramaturgic description of social 
experience the difference freedom and rule-governed experience blurs. 
Comprehending the lives of others as a drama to some extent takes 
away with one hand (the reality principle) what it offers with the other 
(emotional significance). We may nonetheless agree on the ontogenetic 
status of freedom in this account—what was once the focus of free-play 
becomes something held to in all seriousness in the moment of willful 
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action; improvisation is deployed toward an intentional and earnest 
construction of reality.  
 
For all its usefulness in reintroducing the improvisatory and the playful 
back into a discussion of the social, what the metaphor ‘life is a drama’ 
obscures, then, is the dimension of wanting or willing in the making of 
reality. While from the outside the excited use of symbols and gestures 
in a given event may look like drama—if we are unaffected by its 
consequences—to the person involved that world is serious and 
consequential. It is the relativity of the symbols and gestures in relation 
to our point of view that makes it seem dramatic. It is notable, in this 
regard, that a recurrent element of ecstatic religion is precisely aimed at 
temporarily, or even permanently, muting the will. Aldous Huxley 
captures an aspect of this when he describes the experience of taking 
the hallucinogen mescalin. Everyday consciousness involves a 
narrowing and specifying of perception and worldview: mescalin 
enables an opening up of sensation; a freeing of perception from the 
self’s willful drive to organize reality in a particular way: 
 
Though the intellect remains unimpaired and though perception 
is enormously improved, the will suffers a profound change for 
the worse. The mescalin taker sees no reason for doing anything 
in particular and finds most of the causes for which, at ordinary 
times, he was prepared to act and suffer, profoundly 
uninteresting. He can’t be bothered with them, for the good 
reason that he has better things to think about (1994:13). 
 
These ‘better things to think about’ take the form of a greatly intensified 
awareness of how the world is qualitatively for itself before it has been 
filtered into ontological categories. For example, ‘at ordinary times the 
eye concerns itself with such problems as Where?—How far?—How 
situated in relation to what?’ Contrastingly, under the effects of 
mescalin ‘space… lost its predominance. The mind was concerned, not 
with measures and locations, but with being and meaning’ ([1954]1994: 
9). 
 
This is freedom of a distinct kind. As Huxley notes, it is the type of 
freedom that Henri Bergson discusses in Time and Free Will (1910) 
where, for example, in our contemplation of ‘orangeness’ we allow 
ourselves to escape from our preconception of ‘orange’: subjectively the 
quality is freed from the category; the world no longer appears as a 
preformed ontological assemblage and instead offers an unmediated 
array of qualities (1994:11). This is perceptual free-play, but unlike play 
in Vygotsky’s or Fortes’ description it is non-dialectical: in it the pure 
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contemplativeness of an uncontained self blends with an unbounded 
world. There are suggestions here of Buddhist self-liberation and the 
practice of becoming ‘no one’ that Matsui describes for Muneyoshi 
Yanagi (chapter 2). Of course, this subjective state, or perhaps non-state, 
is also utterly different to the ego-assertive songs of freedom of Aché 
hunters whose motif is a willful ‘me, me, me’. Here we might consider 
I.M. Lewis’ observation that ecstasis has particular significance for 
people living under atomized or highly individualized conditions 
where it presents a release from a sense of isolation (1971). In contrast, 
Clastres describes Aché self-assertion as an episodic expression of 
individuality in a social field more generally marked by the absorption 
of ego within patterns of exchange. Finally what Huxley describes is 
also unlike the distinction that Sandra makes when she talks of being a 
‘slave’ in her cubicle but ‘free’ in her own mind: the feeling of there 
being an inhibiting boundary between those two worlds—outer, bodily 
and inner, mental—is here no longer primary. At the same time, we 
may begin to notice a continuum at work in which ‘freedom’ takes on 
different signficances with regard to the organization of self and world 
at different moments and within distinct kinds of perceptual space. 
 
When he analysed Tallensi play, Fortes did so teleologically in terms of 
the achievement of adulthood; but the contrast of childhood play and 
adult seriousness seems overstated in some ways. Even if we can agree 
what it is that ‘ends’ in adulthood, surely improvisation does not cease 
even there, because the experimentation regarding truth, seriousness 
and legality—absolute maturity—never finalizes itself. For Tallensi, 
while the knowledge of children was incomplete in relation to that of 
adults, adulthood was also incomplete in relation to the knowledge of 
the ancestors. The proximal arena of imagining and acting never stops 
changing in relation to self understanding, therefore improvisation as 
freeplay is always at work if for no other reason than that the living 
individual cannot know what the ancestors want. 
 
 
Freedom as common sense, freedom in social science 
 
Although Peter Loizos, for example, laments that for too long 
anthropology avoided the theme of freedom because the discipline was 
under ‘the spell of Durkheim and Marx, and so preoccupied with the 
problems of whole cultures, rather than those of individuals’ (in Barker 
1995: 89), the theme of freedom, as we have seen, is not necessarily tied 
up to individuality. Even writing at a time when anthropology was 
almost exclusively group oriented, Leach (1963: 86) was nonetheless 
able to point out a key anthropological predicament: ‘since the word 
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freedom is a powerful symbol in the ideology of the Western world – 
especially the American part of it – it is only natural that Western 
anthropologists should endeavor to demonstrate that Freedom is a 
value esteemed by the Noble Savage.’ There is a hint of a larger 
problem here: an anthropology which endeavors to demonstrate that 
other people around the world esteem the same values that Westerners, 
particularly Americans, do, can only be considered problematic. 
However, at the same time, Fischer and Marcus (1986) may have a point 
when they argue that an anthropology historically rooted in the 
Western world cannot ignore its own conditions of possibility, and 
cannot afford to ignore what impact its own powerful symbols have 
when it comes to understanding life as lived by others.  
Leach’s suspicions regarding ‘freedom’ as a word that was no longer 
relevant for thinking about how human societies organized themselves 
reflect a concern with an inherited set of ideas about freedom which no 
longer seemed to plausibly fit the circumstances of post-war Europe 
and America. In contrast, for thinkers of the Enlightenment, like the 
Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson, human freedom had been a self-
evident truth made obvious in the diverse choices humans made with 
regard to their ‘wants’ and ‘opinions’—their way of life. The contrast 
between an Amerindian living on the Orinoco versus a prince in a 
European palace made the multiplicity of the possible choices and 
freedoms abundantly clear.  
The occupations of men, in every condition, bespeak their 
freedom of choice, their various opinions, and the multiplicity of 
wants by which they are urged… The tree which an American on 
the banks of the Oroonoko has chosen to climb for retreat, and 
the lodgment of his family, is to him a convenient dwelling. The 
sopha, the vaulted dome, and the colonnade, do not more 
effectually content their native inhabitant (Ferguson 
[1782]2011:10). 
 
In the same vein, Kant defines what he called Pragmatic Anthropology 
as the study of what human beings ‘make of themselves’ as ‘free-acting’ 
beings. This type of inquiry he opposed to Physiological Anthropology, 
which consists of an exploration of what ‘nature makes of the human 
being’ (Kant [1798]2009:3). For Kant, as for other Enlightenment figures 
there is an aspect of being human that is physiologically given, but 
there is also an aspect that is subjectively made. In particular, Kant 
highlighted that the schemas and concepts we deploy to understand 
our own lives are significantly of our own making. It makes a difference 
to our living in the world which schemas and concepts we live by. 
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Thus, we spontaneously fabricate some dimensions of our own lives; 
these acts of imaginative fabrication, though they do not absolutely 
alter reality as given, become, to adapt a phrase of Vygotsky, our zone 
of proximal freedom. One purpose of pragmatic anthropology as a kind 
of inquiry was, then, precisely to explore the extent and limits of human 
freedom in practice. In certain areas of social inquiry this view of 
freedom as the essence of growth and change in human groups has 
been retained: ‘we can grow cultures’ proposes the anthropologist Tom 
McFeat, ‘which, by the way, is a very nice experience; there is a planting 
and a growth and a budding and harvesting; there seems to be death 
and new growth’ (1974:xii). 
 
However, in contrast to this optimistic view, when Fred Alford asked 
his young American informants what they understood by ‘freedom’ in 
the early 2000s they seemed, almost uniformly, to see this word as little 
more than a synonym for one kind of out-of-reach cultural form—
power and money. To have money was to have freedom and vice versa. 
Freedom had little to do with the exercise of imagination toward shared 
tasks. Preeminently freedom was understood as an objective measure of 
the power to ‘do what you want’; this, in turn, being quantified in 
money terms. Alford was dismayed at the degree to which, because 
they felt they had little absolute control over their circumstances, 
freedom had come to seem illusory to them.  
 
Maybe money can’t buy happiness, but money buys freedom. 
Freedom means having enough money to do what I want,’ said 
one young woman… 
Most talked in these terms. Freedom is not about being left alone 
by others; nor is freedom about such effete rights as free speech. 
Many disparaged the concept. Partly because they took it for 
granted, but also because it doesn't matter if you can say what 
you want if you can’t do what you want (Alford 2005:1-2). 
 
At first sight these responses seem reminiscent of Georg Simmel’s 
observations on the kind of alienated freedom provoked by a mass 
society that demands little of the individual as a citizen: 
 
If freedom swings to extremes; if the largest group… affords 
greater play to extreme formations and malformations of 
individualism, to misanthropic detachment, to baroque and 
moody life styles, to crass egoism – then this is merely the 
consequence of the wider group’s requiring less of us, of its being 
less concerned with us, and thus of its lesser hindering of the full 
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development even of perverse impulses (Simmel in Levine 
1971:270-271). 
 
But Alford’s informants seem to have gone beyond this kind of 
alienated individualism: for them freedom is no longer understood as a 
direct expression of the individual’s liveliness—a defiant ‘acting out’ in 
the face of an uninterested world. Rather, subjective action of even this 
kind has lost its meaning because it has become a dependent variable of 
one objectively determining factor—the availability of money. The logic 
here seems to run somewhat like this: if all opportunities can be priced 
on the market, then it follows that ‘free choice’ is simply a function of 
relative access to the medium of exchange: this is freedom understood 
as an ‘opportunity cost’ in the micro-economics of everyday life. 
 
To what extent this kind of view reflects the actual effects of ‘structural 
violence’ or the influence of a Social Scientific devaluation of individual 
freedom during the Twentieth Century it is impossible to say, but 
undoubtedly the pessimism of Alford’s informants reflects a stance that 
was mainstream for much of the latter part of that century. James 
Laidlaw (2002) argues that the lack of research on freedom in 
anthropology is mostly a consequence of the deep influence of 
Durkheimian social determinism on the discipline: ‘Durkheim’s social is 
effectively Immanuel Kant’s notion of the moral law, with the all-
important change that the concept of human freedom, which was of 
course central for Kant, has been neatly excised from it’ (Laidlaw 2002: 
312). However, something equally interesting is the imprecision with 
which freedom is commonly debated, when it is debated in social 
science at all. Even though the social determination of individual 
choices could not be shown in any decisive way, social scientists 
nonetheless tended to hold to the idea that ‘free choice’ was 
incompatible with the idea of empirical causality in general and was 
hence an illusion: 
 
In the social sciences… [m]any of our… propositions are only 
statistically true and hold good only within particular historical 
circumstances… If these conditions make trouble for us as social 
scientists, remember they are a great advantage to humanity, by 
leaving men the illusion of choice. I speak of the illusion because I 
myself believe that what each of us does is absolutely 
determined… The illusion of free will… is a vital illusion… The 
most amusing case is the Marxists, who theoretically believe in 
macroscopic laws… but who will not allow the laws alone to 
produce the result… (Homans 1967:103-104) 
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George Homans determinism (‘I myself believe’), like that of many 
other social scientists of this period up to the present, is riven with 
doubt and contradiction. Reading his bold claim now, we may ask, if 
life is indeed ‘absolutely determined’ what possible difference could 
upholding the ‘illusion’ of free choice make? What is the difference 
between this convoluted stance and the idea that how people act, based 
on their view of things, has tangible and freely achieved effects (not least 
for themselves)? As Bradley and Green had already argued in the 
previous century, perspectives like Homans’ seem to stem from 
following the mistaken logic that since the act results from the agent, 
her agency must be the result of some previous act (1884); but all this 
does is to inject a hopeless degree of ambiguity into the word ‘agent’.  
 
‘Beliefs’ like Homans’ persist even when (as Homans admits) we are 
unable (ever) to indicate a location of the cause for an act except in the 
imagination and motivation of the agent in question. Where Kant 
envisaged a study of what humans make of themselves out of their 
freedom, post-WWII social science viewed itself as on a parallel track to 
the physical sciences. Sociology and Social Anthropology were by this 
definition the study of what society makes of the human being. 
Epistemologically, there was simply no place in the mainstream 
academic division of labour for the kind of human-centred intellectual 
pursuit that Kant envisaged. Thus there came to be very little if any 
room for a discussion of freedom at all, except as a sign or artifact of a 
certain system of governance. Certain versions of Foucault (Foucault 
himself seems to have left the possibilities of freedom open) like that 
presented by Nikolas Rose in his book Governing the Soul, envisage 
freedom as a peculiar feature of how modern subjectivity is 
constructed. Moderns are, he argues: 
 
‘Obliged to be free… modern selves have become attached to the 
project of freedom, have come to live in terms of its identity, and 
to search for the means to enhance that autonomy through the 
application of expertise. In this matrix of power and freedom the 
modern self has been born’ (Rose 1990: 258). 
 
This all begs reflection on the multitude of cases already mentioned 
here of non-modern peoples for whom autonomy and freedom are also 
seemingly of the essence. Are all these cases merely secondary 
elaborations of the modern psychic complex directed outward? This 
seems far-fetched. The opposite case can be made; moderns—unlike say 
the Winnebago as described by Radin—often seem to see freedom not 
as an obvious fact connected to being human, but rather as something 
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mostly contingent: from this kind of modern point of view freedom, 
though much talked about, freedom is rhetorically overplayed and is 
not of great relevance to life as lived. Perhaps Rose’s critique points to 
another concern then: any particular definition of freedom can be seen 
as an attack against the limited range of human freedoms actually or 
practically available to moderns.  
 
As Englund points out, attempts at defining freedom have paradoxical 
effects. ‘what appears as freedom from one perspective can be mere 
trivia from another.’ For him, though, ‘a crucial issue is whether those 
who occupy the public sphere are prisoners of their particular 
perspective.’ ‘[T]he obligation to rethink the promise of freedom is 
constant and riddled with moral, political and intellectual quandaries’ 
(1996: 4). Discussing the nationalist discourse of liberation in Africa, he 
notes a series of shifts, from a focus on liberation from colonial powers 
into other, newer notions of freedom, such as a human rights based 
views. Changed discourses open but also close the circuit for defining 
freedom—‘new freedoms entail new prisoners’ (Englund 2006: 4). 
Rather than intrinsically free, modern individuals often describe 
themselves as suspended in webs of causation over which they have 
little ultimate control: any particular ‘freedoms’ they may possess seem 
minor if not trivial with regard to the grand social scheme. There may 
instead be an emphasis on deploying various tactics of establishing a 
more attractive position for the self in a social field that cannot in any 
absolute way be changed by ‘free will’.  
 
Considering different tactics that can bring freedom to the self, the 
positionality of the ethnographer also deserves profound scrutiny when 
it comes the production of anthropological knowledge. Would the 
privileged position of ‘researcher’ imply more freedom to 
anthropologists than the position of ‘ethnographic subjects’? Or would 
the opposite be the case? Pipyrou (chapter 4), concerns herself exactly 
with the implications of her own positionality in relation to different 
civil society groups in South Italy. She invites us to reflect: ‘How can 
data generated out of intimidation and fear, or when the researcher is 
completely out of control of the situation, be fairly assessed?’ Perhaps, 
such a question becomes even more engaging because anthropologists 
more often than not conduct their work in contexts in which they 
assume a position of authority (and freedom) superior to others?  Or 
would it just be that ‘academic freedom’ sometimes is taken for 
granted? Regardless of the exact answer, any anthropology of freedom 
needs to concern itself with the implications of asymmetric relations of 
authority and freedom in its own production. 
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Towards an ontological understanding of freedom 
Regarding the very pragmatic puzzles that ethnographic research into 
freedom presents, an ontological approach can prove helpful. 
Awareness of the existence of freedom seems often to start from the 
presence of a signifier of freedom in the concrete research context, 
extending from there into the various meanings that freedom acquires 
in daily use. In this sense, an anti-foundational metaphysics of freedom 
arises for the researcher, based on practical research needs, something 
that William James (1975) would possibly call a pragmatic metaphysics. 
The historical focus of anthropology on the importance and precedence 
of meaning has left discussions over the ontological dimensions of the 
ethnographic enterprise somehow underexplored when it comes to 
freedom. Ethnography, as an empirical way of knowing, could be (and 
has recently become) much more attuned to ontological concerns. This 
offers a partial response to the problems that Derrida (1997) and others 
have identified with what has been called the ‘the metaphysics of the 
logos’. Derrida argues that in logocentric metaphysics ‘The word is (...) 
already a constituted unity’ ‘That the signified (...) is always already in 
the position of the signifier, is the apparently innocent proposition 
within which the metaphysics of the logos, of presence and 
consciousness, must reflect upon.’ (Derrida 1997: 93) It is necessary to 
challenge this seemingly unavoidable unity of the word and to 
underline how the supposed precedence of meaning relies upon other 
concurrent qualities and imaginative connotations of freedom. As 
things stand, the ontological dimension of our understanding of 
freedom in daily life remains underexplored as long as we remain 
preoccupied with the word alone. As Laclau reminds us ‘the signifiers 
being goes beyond its ‘designated role’ which is to signify. As 
anthropologists, we should also be concerned with ‘the fact of signifiers 
having effects other than meaning effects’ (in Sumic 2004). Beyond 
words there is the bodily-imaginative practice of life: hence our 
emphasis in the title of this volume on ‘freedom in practice’. 
What, then, finally, is the relationship between the word ‘liberada’ (as in 
‘travesti liberada’ and ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’ (Lino e Silva in chapter 7), or 
‘wayegreru’ and ‘slave’ (Gow) as experiences of life? An important aim in 
any exploration of freedom from an anthropological perspective should 
be to understand what people with whom we share our enterprise, 
think and how they live freedom themselves. In order to reach an 
understanding of how freedom is experienced by an ‘other’ (beyond 
oneself), an ontological discussion about the basis for our 
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understanding is surely desirable. Quoting Quine (1981: 2): ‘Little can 
be done in the way of tracking thought processes except when we can 
put words to them. For something objective that we can get our teeth 
into we must go after the words.’ In this sense, words, and language in 
general, can be used as a means to enter a variety of dimensions 
regarding the existence of freedom – beyond meaning. ‘Freedom’ as 
logos may index precisely the authorizing ‘rule’ that freedom as free-
play is intent on bending, extending, reshaping—or breaking. The 
terminology used—‘liberty’, ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’ may, indeed, be 
being deployed to hide some other or further unvoiced proximal claim 
about, or potential for, being human (see Huon Wardle’s discussion in 
chapter 3). 
Regarding the apparent vagueness of a definition of freedom on 
ontological grounds, we argue that all specific individuatives tend to be 
vague. This seems to be a characteristic of words in general. For 
example, terms such as ‘dog’ or ‘desk’ are also very vague. Many 
different objects and qualities of object go under the name ‘desk’. As 
Quine (1981: 13) reminds us, ‘this is vagueness only of classification and 
not of existence.’ The fact that the most varied different physical objects 
count as ‘desks’ is not a problem for the existence of desks. Equally, the 
fact that the most varied actions, concepts, and life events could come to 
be counted as instances of freedom, is not in itself a problem. Quite the 
contrary, this could be a remedy to some of the unwanted consequences 
that follow from restrictive semantic definitions of freedom, alongside 
the overbearing power that certain meanings of freedom tend to assume 
at the expense of others. Quine (1981) has famously argued that no 
translation can absolutely determine meaning, and that no 
metaphysical theory can exclusively determine existence. The 
ontological definition of freedom proposed here extends the hope that 
freedom may come to exist under a variety of understandings, that it 
can assume a wide variety of meanings, even various, conflicting and 
contradictory ones. From here we may gain access to the further 
‘possible freedoms’ that Foucault refers to. Such a radical 
understanding of the complexities of freedom as lived experience can 
only be achieved when freedom has been liberated from the precedence 
of meaning itself.  
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